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MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST IMMUNITY AFTER City of Columbia
v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., II1 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).

Abstract: For most of this century, states and municipalities were immune from liability
for anticompetitive action. However, in City of Lafayette v. LouisianaPower & Light Co.,
the Supreme Court sharply limited antitrust immunity for municipalities. The Lafayette
Court held that municipal immunity only applied to municipalities following a clearly
articulated state policy. In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc, the
Supreme Court has expanded the immunity available to municipalities by requiring only
that a municipality's actions be a foreseeable result of a specific grant of state authority.
This Note examines the history of municipal immunity and the Omni ruling. The Note
argues that the foreseeability test is inadequate because it violates federalism principles
and treats home rule municipalities inequitably. The Note concludes that the Omni rule
should be broadened to protect home rule municipalities.

The Supreme Court recently broadened the state action immunity
that municipalities enjoy from the Sherman Antitrust Act. According
to the previous rule, municipalities could be sued under the Sherman
Act because of the anticompetitive results of zoning ordinances that
they enacted. Under City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., 1 the Supreme Court's most recent ruling on the matter, the Court
has greatly expanded municipal antitrust immunity. Municipalities
now have antitrust immunity for their zoning ordinances and for
many other activities for which they were previously liable.
I.

STATE ACTION IMMUNITY FROM THE SHERMAN
ACT

The municipal antitrust immunity question dates to the passage of
the Sherman Act in 1890. The language of the Act is sweeping:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 2 At that
time, the Sherman Act could not have applied to the states because the
Supreme Court had not yet interpreted the commerce clause as
extending to state government actions. State immunity from the Act
1. 111 S.Ct. 1344 (1991).
2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1973); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1991) ("Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....").
3. Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential
Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REv. 227, 229 (1987); cf John E. Lopatka, State Action and
MunicipalAntitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 52-54 (1984).
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did not become an issue until after the Supreme Court expanded the
commerce clause.
A.

Parker v. Brown: The Beginning of State Action Immunity

State immunity from the Sherman Act is largely based on the
landmark decision Parker v. Brown.4 California had developed a
"marketing program" for the 1940 raisin crop that included a classification program and a controlled price for raisins.5 The plaintiff, a raisin grower, brought suit against the State under the Sherman Act.
California's action would have been illegal if undertaken by "individual agreement," but the Court held that state action was entirely different. 6 In fact, the Court found that the Sherman Act's language did
not restrain state action.7 The Court's policy basis for state immunity
was based on federalism: "In a dual system of government ... the
states are sovereign .... [A]n unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's
control over its offices and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."' Thus, the Parker Court held that state action was immune
from the Sherman Act.
B.

The Limitation of Municipal Immunity: Vicarious Liability in
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.

The Supreme Court first limited municipal immunity from the Sherman Act in City of Lafayette v. LouisianaPower & Light Co.9 Despite
some prior weakening in state action immunity,10 courts since Parker
had assumed that antitrust immunity extended to municipalities as
well as to the states."1 However, Lafayette sharply limited municipal
immunity. Petitioners in Lafayette were Louisiana cities operating
utilities inside and outside of their city limits. The cities sued a competing utility, alleging Sherman Act violations that harmed their elec4. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
5. Id. at 346-48.
6. Id. at 350-51.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 351.
9. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
10. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Goldfarb, the Court narrowed
state action to situations where state agents are compelled by the state to regulate commercial
activity. Id. at 791. The Court relied on language in Parkeremphasizing that the raisin program
was under "legislative command." Id. at 788 (quoting Parker,317 U.S. at 350); see also Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (finding immunity due to direct action by the state);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (finding na immunity despite state
involvement).
11. Stuart L. Deutsch, Antitrust Challenges to Local Zoning and Other Land Use Controls, 60
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 63, 65 (1984).
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tric service. The competing utility counterclaimed, also under the
Sherman Act. 2 The cities claimed Parker immunity to the counterclaims. A plurality of the Supreme Court held, however, that Parker
immunity applied to municipalities only under certain narrow conditions. Immunity applied where the state legislature had both given the
municipality authority "to operate in a particular area" and "contemplated the kind of action complained of."' 3
The plurality's policy basis for granting municipal immunity only
through the state stemmed from a mistrust of local decision making.
Fearing that local decisions would be too parochial, the plurality
opined that municipalities were "[no] more likely to comport with the
broader interest of national economic well-being than are those of private corporations."' 4 The four dissenting Justices would have found
immunity based on Parkerand upon their confidence in local decision
making. The dissent argued that Parker created immunity for "'the
state or its municipality.' ,15 The dissent also pointed out differences
between local government and private business that should justify
municipal immunity, primarily that a local government is subject to
popular control. 6 Finally, they predicted the decision would create
problems for local government: unwarranted federal interference, a
7
chilling effect on experimentation, and financial jeopardy.'
C. Applying a Clearly Articulated State Policy Test to
Municipalities:Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder
The Supreme Court outlined a state action test for municipal immunity in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder. 8 The city
of Boulder, Colorado, operated under a home rule provision in the
state constitution. Home rule gives a municipality the "full right of
self-government in both local and municipal matters."' 9 In accord
with its powers, in 1966 the city had granted one cable television company a limited license to operate. In 1980, the assignee of the original
12. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 391-92.
13. Id. at 415 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434
(5th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 435 U.S. 389 (1978)).
14. Id. at 403. Chief Justice Burger concurred due to the cities' proprietary activity. Id. at
418 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
15. Id. at 429 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by White, Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ.) (quoting
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)).
16. Id. at 430.
17. Id. at 439-41.
18. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
19. Id. at 43; see COLO. CONsT. art. XX, § 6.
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permit, along with a competing company, planned to expand cable
service in the city.2 0 The city council decided, however, to impose a
three-month moratorium on cable expansion in order to draft an ordinance that would regulate the activity and promote competition before
one company could dominate the market. 2 1 Petitioner, the permitholding company, sued under section 1 of the Sherman Act, claiming
the moratorium restrained trade.2 2
The Supreme Court found that unless a local ordinance restricting
competition responded to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" state policy, local government was not immune from antitrust actions.2 3 Applying the clear articulation test, the majority
found that home rule merely allowed local control and did not articulate a specific state policy with respect to cable television. 24 Thus,
Boulder's regulations were not immune from antitrust suits.
D. The 1984 Boulder Bill
Congress soon acted to limit Boulder. The holding in Boulder, with
the treble damages for antitrust violations provided by the Clayton
Act, 25 prompted commentators to argue that many cities were in
financial jeopardy, and that there had been a chilling effect on local
regulation.26 When Congress acted in 1984, there were over 300 antitrust suits against cities pending in the federal courts.27 The Local
Government Antitrust Act of 198428 eliminated many of the bankruptcy fears by eliminating treble damages for local governments.2 9
The Act, however, did not provide complete immunity. The Act still
allowed for equitable relief and attorneys' fees for the winning party
and did not fully answer the question of personal liability for local
20. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 45.
21. Id. at 46.
22. Id. at 46-47.
23. Id. at 54 (relying on California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97 (1980) (to qualify for immunity, the action must follow a clearly articulated state
policy actively supervised by the state)). The Boulder Court also said state supervision might be
required. Id. at 51 n.14.
24. Id. at 55-56.
25. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15(a) (West 1973).
26. Lopatka, supra note 3, at 24.
27. Stuart Deutsch & JoAnn Butler, Recent Limits on Municipal Antitrust Liability, LAND
UsE L., Jan., 1987, at 3, 4. The plaintiffs in Lafayette, for example, were asking for $540 million
from cities with a combined population of about 75,000. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 440 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by White, Blackmun &
Rehnquist, JJ.).
28. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 34-36 (West Supp. 1991) (the Boulder Bill).
29. Id.
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officials.3" Thus, some commentators predicted that municipal antitrust suits would continue as before.31
E.

Limiting Boulder: Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,32 a unanimous Supreme
Court drew back from the Boulder rule.3 3 In Hallie, the city of Eau
Claire, Wisconsin refused to extend its sewer service to unincorporated
townships unless the towns voted to incorporate. A state statute gave
Eau Claire authority to fix the area of service and required that serviced areas incorporate.34 The towns brought an antitrust suit. The
towns relied on a broad reading of Boulder, contending that the
Wisconsin statute did not demonstrate a clear "state policy to displace
competition" or make "express mention of anticompetitive
'35
conduct.
The Hallie Court held that the action qualified for immunity under
the clear articulation test.3 6 It was unclear, however, whether the
Court had retained the clear articulation test as expressed in Boulder,
or whether it had created a new "foreseeable result" test. The Court
required only that the statute "clearly contemplate" that the anticompetitive effect in question would result from the legislative grant of
authority.37 Accordingly, the Court carefully considered the statute at
issue and found it sufficient that "the statutes authorized the City to
provide sewage services and also to determine the areas to be served.
We think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would result
from this broad authority to regulate."3 Yet when describing its
holding, the Court said that the city's actions were taken "pursuant to
30. The Act exempts officials "acting in an official capacity," but does not state whether it
includes officials who conspire with private parties or who otherwise violate antitrust laws. See
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 212.2c n.18 (1991).
31. Deutsch & Butler, supra note 27, at 5. But see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 30,
at § 212.2c (predicting that the number of suits would drop).
32. 471 U.S. 34 (1985); see also Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United
States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985) (state agency did not need express legislative authority to obtain state
action immunity where the state policy is to displace competition).
33. But see William H. Page, Interest Groups Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v.
Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 642-44 (arguing that Hallie
did little to change the clear articulation requirement).
34. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 41.
35. Id. at 41-42.

36. Id. at 47.
37. Id. at 42. But see City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1344,
1360 n.5 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by White & Marshall, JJ., arguing that Hallie did
not end clear articulation).
38. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42.
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a clearly articulated state policy to replace competition" and did not
mention foreseeability.3 9 Thus, the exact standard remained unclear.
II.

POLICY REASONS FOR AND AGAINST MUNICIPAL
IMMUNITY

Commentary on the limitation of municipal antitrust immunity
abounds. Many argue for greater immunity because municipalities
pose little danger of antitrust violations, enforcement is inefficient, and
the principles of federalism allow for local autonomy. Others maintain that municipalities are in a position to abuse the power that antitrust immunity would give.
The first argument for municipal antitrust immunity is that local
governments present little monopoly danger to the electorate. Further, what danger they do present can be most efficiently controlled on
the local level. Commentators find the same differences between a
municipality and a private actor that the Supreme Court found
between the state and a private actor in Parker.' Being subject to
popular control, a municipality will normally avoid anticompetitive
activity that does not promote the greater good.4 1 A municipality is
also a branch of the state government.4 2 Municipalities are thus subject to intensive state review, both on an administrative level and
through the state courts.43 Popular control and state review eliminate
the need for further federal review under the Sherman Act.
A second argument is that municipal antitrust liability does not pro4
mote one of the primary goals of antitrust law, economic efficiency.
Commentators assert that municipal antitrust liability is inefficient.4 5
Though municipalities are no longer liable for treble damages, commentators point out that the state action doctrine still imposes signifi39. Id. at 47. The Court also ended questions about the degree of state supervision required
in municipality cases by stating that "the active state supervision requirement should not be
imposed in cases in which the actor is a municipality." Id. at 46. For earlier treatment of state
supervision, see supra note 23; see also Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455
U.S. 40, 71 n.6 (1982).
40. See Jorde, supra note 3, at 229; supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
41. See Lopatka, supra note 3, at 66-68.
42. Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883) ("Municipal
corporations are instrumentalities of the state for the convenient administration of government
....
(cited
.) in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 429 (1978)).
43. See Lopatka, supra note 3, at 69 (state legislature has "almost unlimited control" over
cities); Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipai Regulation and Federal
Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 719, 753-55 (1985) (state courts exercise strict control over
home rule cities).
44. Lopatka, supra note 3, at 54-55.
45. Id.
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cant costs. First, defending an antitrust suit is notoriously
expensive.4 6 Many smaller cities cannot afford to defend such suits.
Second, if the municipality loses the suit, it must both pay the plaintiff's legal fees and submit to an injunction.4 7 Third, because the state
action doctrine requires some form of state approval, municipalities
and state legislatures must spend time and money lobbying for and
drafting specific directives."a Consequently, some conclude that the
above costs, or even the threat thereof, delay or "chill" beneficial local
government action.

Commentators also suggest that municipal liability is inefficient
where the local government is the best regulator.4 9 In most instances
of local concern such as zoning, cable television regulation, sewage
disposal, and ambulance service, the local government is in the best
position to regulate in accordance with the unique needs of the community. 0 Requiring the state to take regulatory action forces regulation at higher costs by officials who are not in the best position to
regulate or to account for their decisions.
Underlying all of the above arguments is the view that the principles
of federalism discourage municipal antitrust liability. Federal intru-

sion into municipal regulation is similar to, and as problematic as, the
federal intrusions during the Lochner era.5 1 Many also see the promo46. One Maryland town incurred $12,000 in expenses when the town's yearly budget was
$18,151. See Susan M. Stevens, Note, Antitrust Immunity for Local Governments: Maryland's
Response in the Wake of Boulder, 45 MD. L. REv. 1045, 1064 (1986).
47. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 30, at § 212.2c; see 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 34-36 (West
Supp. 1991).
48. Maryland invested significant time and expense to enact new municipal guidelines. See
Stevens, supra note 46, at 1056-63; see also Lopatka, supranote 3, at 75 ("There are 82,290 units
of local government .... Simple multiplication of the number of municipalities by the number of
municipal acts that might appear anticompetitive suggests the staggering direct costs of requiring
specific state authorization.").
49. See Jorde, supra note 3, at 232 n.28; Robert E. Bienstock, Comment, Municipal Trust
Liability: Beyond Immunity, 73 CAL. L. RV. 1829, 1852-56 (1985) (proposing a test to
determine when the local government is the appropriate regulator).
50. See Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 43, at 758-77 (arguing that the position of
"best regulator" ought to provide immunity for local government action); see also Carol M.
Rose, PlanningandDealing:PiecemealLand Controlsas a Problem ofLocal Legitimacy, 71 CAL.
L. REv. 837, 882-87, 911 (1983) (arguing that the character of local politics is more suited to
land use regulations).
51. During the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), judges invalidated legislation
with which they disagreed by relying on substantive due process. See Hovenkamp &
Mackerron, supra note 43, at 758 ("The 'liberty of contract' espoused in Lochnerv. New York has
become 'the right to an unrestrained market,' but the basic principle is the same: Federal law
creates a substantive limitation on the power of local government to impose economic regulation
on private businesses.") (footnote omitted); Bienstock, supra note 49, at 1846; Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982).
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tion of local experimentation as an important policy behind federalism.5 2 In the context of economic regulation, municipalities engage in
creative anticompetitive activities to correct market defects such as
public goods, natural monopolies, or externalities. 53 For example, a
city might interfere in local electricity distribution and enhance efficiency in what might otherwise be an unchecked monopoly.5 4 Municipalities might further act to promote values other than efficiency such
55
as public safety, redistribution of wealth, or exclusionary zoning.
Finally, the concerns of governmental efficiency and enforcement at
the local level previously discussed are also interests of federalism. 6
Local responsibility promotes citizen participation, enhances diffusion
of power, and most important for many commentators, creates the
feeling and reality of local autonomy.57
On the other hand, commentators who favor antitrust liability also
base much of their reasoning on the policies of federalism. These commentators focus on the dangers of excessive local government power.5 8
Local governments often lack the mix of interests that exist on the
state level, making them more susceptible to factions. 59 Thus, the
argument is that municipalities are likely to act for their own parochial interests and should be treated more like private actors. 60
III.

CITY OF COLUMBIA V OMNI OUTDOOR
ADVERTISING, INC.

The latest Supreme Court decision in the municipal antitrust cases,
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, In1c., 6 1 explores the
limits of the state action exemption and retreats from Boulder even
more than Hallie did. The majority further eased the standard that
municipal action must meet in order to qualify for state action immunity. In addition, the Court refused to recognize a conspiracy excep52. Jorde, supra note 3, at 232.
53. Lopatka, supra note 3, at 56-61; see Bienstock, supra note 49, at 1852-54 (regulating
market failures is justified). Some analysts give cities immunity for action in the public interest.
See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE LAW § 10.02 (1991).
54. See Lopatka, supra note 3, at 57.
55. See id. at 61-63.
56. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
57. See Jorde, supra note 3, at 230-34.
58. See Page, supra note 33, at 637-40 (The Federalist No. 10 merits application to
municipalities).
59. See id.; Rose, supra note 50, at 853-57.
60. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
61. 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Blackmun, O'Connor,
Kennedy & Souter, JJ. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which White & Marshall, JJ.,
joined).
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tion to state action immunity, either for the city or the alleged coconspirator.
The Omni case involved a battle of billboard companies. Columbia
Outdoor Advertising (COA) was a billboard company in Columbia,
South Carolina. COA had been in business since the 1940's. In 1981,
it controlled 95 percent of the local billboard market. 62 When Omni
Outdoor Advertising, an out-of-town company, tried to move in on
the market, COA (along with various anti-billboard community
groups) lobbied the city council to restrict new billboard construction.
The council first passed an ordinance so restrictive of billboard construction that a state court struck it down on grounds that it gave the
city council unconstitutional discretion. 63 After numerous public
hearings the council passed another ordinance restricting the size,
location, and spacing of billboards in Columbia. 4 COA was little
affected by the ordinance, since it already had its billboards in place,
while Omni's ability to compete was severely impaired. Omni sued
Columbia and COA in federal district court, alleging violations under
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Aware that Hallie had broadened municipal immunity, Omni also alleged a conspiracy between
COA and the Columbia city council.6 5 Omni urged the Court to make
a conspiracy exception even if the Court found that Columbia would
66
otherwise have immunity.
The Supreme Court first decided that the action taken by the city of
Columbia qualified for Parker immunity as "authorized implementation of state policy."' 67 In doing so, the Court used a two-prong test:
authority and foreseeability. The Court noted that its declarations in
Hallie, as well as earlier decisions concerning Parkerimmunity, were
unclear. 68 The Omni Court found that Hallie established that if a
state statute authorized a city's action with a view toward regulation,
62. Id. at 1347.
63. Id. at 1348.
64. Id. This ordinance was enacted pursuant to the South Carolina Zoning Enabling Act.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-7-710 (Law Co-op. 1976) provides: "[l]n order to protect, promote and
improve the public health, safety, morals, convenience, order, appearance, prosperity, and
general welfare, the governing authorities of municipalities and counties may... regulate the
location, height, bulk, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures ...
65. Omni, 111 S.Ct. at 1348.
66. Id. The circuit court overturned the district court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and held that though Columbia would normally have immunity for zoning decisions, there was a
conspiracy exception. Id.; see Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., 891 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd sub norn. City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S.Ct 1344 (1991).
67. Omni, Ill S. Ct. at 1349.
68. Id.
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the city would have immunity from any anticompetitive consequences
of that action.6 9 The ambiguity lies in the word "authorize." It was
unclear whether the Court should review the city ordinance and determine if it complied with the state act under which it was ostensibly
passed. In Omni for instance, the Court would have had to decide if
Columbia's new zoning act was adopted for "the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the community" in
accordance with the state zoning enabling act.70 The Omni majority
rejected any such intrusive role, saying that it would undermine "the
'7 1
very interests of federalism that [Parker was] designed to protect.
Instead, the Court held that the city needed to establish only that it
had "unquestioned zoning power over the size, location, and spacing
72
of billboards.

The Omni Court also found that the ordinance passed the foreseeability prong of the test. The majority acknowledged the clear articulation standard from Lafayette, but grounded its decision on the
foreseeability test outlined in Hallie.73 According to the Court, suppression of competition was a foreseeable result of a zoning enabling
act.7 4
The majority also refused to recognize a conspiracy exception to a
city's immunity. 75 The Omni Court held that there should be no conspiracy exception to the Parker state immunity doctrine because the
exception could easily swallow the rule.7 6 The Court reasoned that
almost any regulation is the result of an agreement between private
parities and the government.77 Nearly all municipal regulation, therefore, would be the result of conspiracy. 78 The Omni Court noted that
the language in Parkerthat courts had used to find such a conspiracy
exception refers to a possible exception to governmental immunity
when the state enters the marketplace as a commercial participant.79
69. Id. at 1350.
70. Id. at 1349.
71. Id. at 1350; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 30, § 212.3b, at 158-60.
72. Omni, 111 S. Ct at 1350.
73. Id.
74. "The very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace unfette-ed business freedom in a
manner that regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition ....
Id.
75. Id. at 1351. Some circuits had ruled otherwise. See, eg., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical
Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 825 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990); Whitworth v. Perkins,
559 F.2d 378, 381-82 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated sub nor. City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S.
992, aff'd on remand, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979).
76. Omn4 III S. Ct. at 1351.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Moreover, many federal and state laws are designed to address corruption in government.8" Accordingly, resorting to antitrust law is
unnecessary. In sum, the Court found that a conspiracy exception is
supported neither by sound policy nor by Parker.8 1
Three Justices joined in a dissenting opinion that emphasized the
danger presented by powerful local governments and challenged the
majority's interpretation of the Hallie case. The dissent argued that
the deference to the states required by federalism does not extend to
municipalities.82 The dissent justified their policy for disfavoring local
autonomy by recalling the doubts voiced in Lafayette about municipal
decision making.8 3 The dissent further argued that the majority read
Hallie incorrectly, pointing out that Hallie had not relied on a foreseeability test alone, but had examined the state's statutes and found a
clearly articulated policy favoring regulation.84 According to the dissent, Hallie still required that the decision to replace competition with
regulation be made at the state level.8" Thus, the Omni dissent would
have required that the state zoning enabling act expressly speak to
"economic regulation" of a specific industry.86 Because the South
Carolina Zoning Enabling Act was neutral as to economic regulation,
the dissent would have held that it did not meet the clear articulation
standard.87
IV.

BENEFICIAL RESULTS AND UNRESOLVED
PROBLEMS

The Omni holding significantly expands a city's ability to regulate
local zoning without challenge under the Sherman Act. The Omni
case affects municipal antitrust liability by expanding the state action
80. Id. at 1353; see, eg., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951 (West 1984) (Hobbs Act).
81. The Court also held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has no conspiracy exception.
Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1354-56. Although outside the scope of this Note, the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine covers businesses that petition the government to take actions favoring their interests at
the expense of competition. The theory is that private parties have free speech rights to lobby the
government for lawful state actions. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961). The Omni majority held that an exception would limit the right to petition the
government and that "Parkerand Noerr are complementary expressions of the principle that the
antitrust laws regulate business, not politics." Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1355.
82. Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1358-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by White & Marshall, JJ.).
83. Id. at 1359 (citing Madison's view that small societies oppress); see supranotes 58-60 and
accompanying text.
84. Omni 111 S. Ct. at 1360 n.5.

85. Id.
86. Id. at 1360-61.
87. Id.
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defense. The effects of the Omni decision are positive because they
expand municipal antitrust immunity. Problems still remain, however, because the foreseeability test violates federalism and treats home
rule cities unfairly.
A.

Omni Creates Absolute Protectionfor Zoning Ordinances

Omni ensures that zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to a zoning
enabling act are absolutely protected by state action immunity from
challenge under the Sherman Act. The importance of this newfound
freedom to municipalities cannot be underestimated. Before Omni,
some courts had found that zoning was not protected, largely because
a zoning enabling act was not seen as an adequately clear articulation
of a state policy to displace competition with regulation."8 Once the
clear articulation standard was weakened in H( !ie, commentators
suggested that zoning might enjoy state action immunity. 9 By using
the foreseeable result test in place of clear articulation, Omni confirms
that a municipality's zoning decisions are immune.9 0
The Omni Court's reasoning should be read to apply broadly to any
zoning enabling act. Before Omni, many courts considered whether
particular enabling statutes suggested a clearly articulated state policy
to suppress competition.9 1 The clear articulation standard required a
searching inquiry of the specific statutory language in question. Under
Omni, statutory inquiry is unnecessary. Although the Court referred
to the South Carolina Zoning Enabling Act early in its decision, its
reasoning is not dependent on the specific language in that statute.
The Court quoted the statute when it declined to undertake a substantive review of Columbia's ordinance.92 However, when the majority
turned their attention to foreseeability, they conspicuously failed to
93
mention any language of the South Carolina Zoning Enabling Act.
The Court spoke to the purpose of zoning in general, not to any pur88. Eg., Mason City Ctr. Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
In Mason City, the court held that a zoning enabling act was not an expression of anticompetitive
policy. Although zoning statutes "sometimes have anticompetitive efflects," the court said it was
"somewhat fatuous to contend that they inevitably reflect a state's clear and affirmative intent to
displace competition." Id. at 742.
89. See MANDELKER et al., supra note 53, § 11.06, at 11-22 to 11-23.
90. Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1350.
91. See, e.g., Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 631 F. Supp. 181 ,N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 841
F.2d 770 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988).
92. Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1349.
93. Id. at 1350.
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pose specific to the South Carolina statute.94 Thus, Omni can be
applied to American zoning enabling acts in general.
The Omni Court's use of the foreseeability test means that municipalities will not have to analogize the zoning enabling language of
their states to that of South Carolina. The specific grant of zoning
authority foreseeably results in anticompetitive activity. Possible
exceptions are local zoning ordinances based on home rule provisions
and, to the extent they may exist, ordinances sanctioned under general
grants of police power.95 In general, however, the Omni decision gives
municipalities immunity from antitrust suits for all zoning ordinances.
B.

Omni Broadens Municipal Antitrust Immunity

The Omni decision will impact all local anticompetitive regulation.
The Omni Court's approach should not be confined to zoning enabling
acts. As discussed below, it should apply to any grant of specific
authority from a state to its municipality.9 6
L

Omni and the Expansion of The State Action Doctrine

The most significant effect of Omni is its strengthening of state
action immunity for municipalities. According to the state action doctrine, a municipality must show that it acted under state authorization. The Supreme Court has developed a two-prong test to determine
whether state action immunity applies to a given action.9 7 Omni has
left its mark on each prong.
a.

Omni and the Authority Prong: The Affirmation of Federalismas
an ImportantAntitrust Policy

Arguing that a municipality has acted outside the scope of its
authority98 is no longer apt to be successful unless the state gave the
municipality no power over the activity.9 9 The Omni Court did not
decide that Columbia had complied with the state zoning enabling act,
94. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 129-41 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Nelson v. City of Seattle, 64
Wash. 2d 862, 395 P.2d 82 (1964) (city allowed to zone under general grant of police power).
96. Note that municipalities have another defense based on the unilateral action theory. In
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the municipality
could not have violated section 1 of the Sherman Act because any action by a municipality,
except in the case of a conspiracy, must be unilateral. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
98. The authority prong is the first part of the state action immunity test.
99. At one point, alleging that a municipality had acted outside the scope of its-authority was
an effective alternate plea for plaintiffs. See Eric W. Hoaglund, Note, Municipal Antitrust
Liability After Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 1039, 1053-55.
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but instead determined that it was improper for the court to even
make the inquiry." The Court refused to review the issue on the basis
of federalist principles."' The Court's reasoning is broad enough to
apply to any anticompetitive regulation undertaken by a municipality.
The Omni decision has so broadened the authority prong that the
only real question left is whether a municipality could fail such a
broad test. Before Omni, it was conceivable that a state statute may
have foreseen anticompetitive activity, but a federal court could have
found that a municipality, though acting within the area covered by
statute, had acted outside the bounds of its specific authority. Under
Omni, the municipality would have to have acted outside the bounds
of its general authority, that is, have enacted a zoning ordinance when
the state had not conferred zoning authority at all. °2 One could
argue, however, that the Omni Court's treatment of the authority
prong does not apply to the analysis of a grant cof authority under a
state's home rule or police power. The Omni decision hinged on the
city's "unquestioned zoning power," originating in the state enabling
act. 103 In contrast, activities based on a home rule grant of authority
have no specific authorization. Thus, one might conclude that Omni
does not preclude inquiry into whether a municipality had authority
under home rule.
The view more consistent with Omni, however, is that activities
based on home rule powers should be treated like those based on a
specific statutory authorization for purposes of the authority prong.
After explaining that it would not decide whether a municipality had
exceeded the bounds of its authority, the Court noted that it had
adopted a concept of authority "broader than what is applied to determine the legality of the municipality's action under state law." 1" If a
municipality is acting in a general area in which it has legally acted
under the home rule grant of authority, there is no greater reason for a
court to inquire into a grant of home rule authority than for a statu100. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111

Ct. 1344, 1349-50 (1991).

101. Ia
102. For examples of municipalities acting outside their authority see Austin Mun. Sec., Inc.
v. National Assn'n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 696 (5th Cir. 1985); Bankers Life and Casualty
Co. v. Larson, 257 F.2d 377 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 879 (1958); La Salle Nat. Bank v.
County of Lake, 579 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see also Hoaglund, supra note 99, at 1054-55.
103. Omni, 111 S.CL at 1350.
104. Id.; see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (refusal to review the conformity of a
court order to state law beyond finding that the state authorized the court to make the type of
order in question).
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tory grant.10 5 There may be some point where a home rule municipality's action is so far beyond its authority that a court would rule on the
authority question. The Omni Court, however, offers no explanation
of where that point might lie.
The Omni Court's treatment of the authority prong shows that federalism and not the public interest model is the basis of municipal
immunity. Some commentators have argued that municipal immunity
should be based on a judicial determination of whether a particular
action was taken for the public good.1 0 6 If the Court were to have
adopted such a view, it would have been evident in the authority
prong. In the case of zoning, for example, the Court could have tested
whether the ordinance was enacted pursuant to the municipality's
authority to further the public "health, safety, morals or the general
welfare." 10 7 Omni expressly refused to administer such a test because
it would be an intrusion on federalism,10 8 and explicitly rejected the
public interest model as a guiding policy. 9 The Court's rejection of
the public interest model is not a rejection of the idea that governmental actions promoting the public good should be immune from antitrust liability. The argument that municipalities ought to be free to
engage in certain anticompetitive actions such as zoning, water, sewer,
and power regulation is one of the strongest reasons to favor municipal
antitrust immunity.1 10 However, as Omni explains, the federal courts
could not engage in substantive review of municipal policy without
violating the principles of federalism. 1 1 Thus, the Omni Court's discussion of the authority prong not only expands municipal antitrust
immunity, it identifies federalism and not the public interest model as
a key policy that courts must consider in antitrust cases.

105. A home rule municipality would have greater trouble proving foreseeability. See infra
notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
107. Omni, 111 S.Ct. at 1349.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1352 ("Parker was not written in ignorance of the reality that determination of
'the public interest' . . . entails ...value judgment, and it was not meant to shift that judgment
from elected officials to judges and juries."). The Court's rejection of the public interest model
occurred in its discussion of a conspiracy exception, but the rejection applies equally here. See
also Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56 (1985)
(antitrust law does not compromise a State's ability to regulate domestic commerce).
110. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985) (emphasizing that a
municipality presumably acts in the public interest).
111. Omni, 111 S. Ct at 1349-50.
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The ForeseeableResult Test

i. Abandoning ClearArticulation
Omni's reliance on the foreseeability standard in the second prong
shows that the Court has implicitly abandoned the clear articulation
test. In Hallie, the Court used an approach whch had elements of
both a clear articulation test and a foreseeability test without clearly
expressing upon which approach it relied.1 12 The Hallie Court concluded, however, that the actions "were taken pursuant to a clearly
articulated state policy. 1 13 In contrast, the Omni Court followed a
bare foreseeability test. As the dissenting opinion points out, South
Carolina had no clearly articulated state policy that authorized municipalities to engage in anticompetitive zoning.114 Rather than imputing
a clear articulation in ambiguous statutory language, the Omni Court
relied on the "foreseeable result" language of Hallie."5 The Omni
Court did not scrutinize statutory language and legislative history as
did the Hallie Court. The Omni Court simply found that a legislature
would have foreseen anticompetitive behavior due to the nature of
zoning. 6 The method employed was to look at the type of legislation
in question and the general policy reasons behind it, and then to determine whether the state legislature would have foreseen an anticompetitive result in enacting that type of legislation.
The Court should abandon the "clear articulation" standard altogether. Such language only confuses the inquiry. The Omni Court
rejected the idea that the delegating state statute had to explicitly
allow anticompetitive activity, instead finding "[i]t is enough ... if
suppression of competition is the 'foreseeable result' of what the statute authorizes." ' 17 The Omni decision stated, nonetheless, that the
authority to regulate must be accompanied by "clear articulation of a
state policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct.""1 ' "Clear articulation" is a misnomer, because actual clear articulation is not required.
112. Halie, 471 U.S. at 40-42. The Omni dissent would later argue that Hallie did not
initiate a foreseeability defense. Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1360 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
White & Marshall, JJ.); see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
113. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
114. The dissent in Omni had a much narrower view of the second prong of the test. See
supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text. Also, several courts had rled that a zoning act is not
evidence of a clearly articulated state policy. See supra note 88.
115. Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1350.
116. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
117. Omni, 111 S.Ct. at 1350. The Court also refused to label billboards "output" and fit
their holding under a clear articulation test. Id. at 1350 n.4.
118. Id. (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985)).
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Unfortunately, several lower courts continue to adhere to the clear
articulation requirement.1 19
ii.

Clear Articulation Should be Abandoned as Impermissible
Substantive Review

Abandoning the clear articulation requirement is consistent with
federalism and local autonomy. A general foreseeability inquiry is
more consistent with the Court's federalist policy of not engaging in
state administrative review. 2 Detailed review of state legislative history and an attempt to reconcile the statute in question with the
imputed expectations of the legislature is exactly the type of activity
the Court wants federal courts to avoid. To do a detailed review on
the second prong of the test would cause the very harm the Court
sought to avoid under the authority prong. Moreover, the states are
much better equipped than federal courts to judge whether municipalities are following state policies. If a municipality is not following the
state policy, the state is fully capable of intervening. Forcing municipalities to predict whether a federal court will characterize a given
piece of legislation as a clear articulation of a state anticompetitive
policy creates an unreasonable financial burden on the municipality. 121
The costs of legislative research and lobbying and the potentiality of
large legal fees produce a chilling effect on local government activity.
Finally, allowing municipalities to operate where state law foreseeably
permits anticompetitive activity allows municipalities more latitude to
regulate local activities. A municipality should be able to regulate
matters of purely local concern without the intrusion of the federal
government through the antitrust laws. Sewer contracts and billboard
regulation do not belong in federal court. In sum, the interests of federalism and local autonomy favor a loose "foreseeable result" test
rather than the more strict "clear articulation" standard.
119. See, eg., Allright Colorado, Inc. v. City of Denver, 937 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir.) (action
must be pursuant to a "clearly expressed" anticompetitive state policy), cert denied, 112 S. Ct.
587 (1991); Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310, 1312 (8th Cir.) ("A
municipality is therefore subject to searching antitrust scrutiny and can defeat antitrust
challenges only if the anticompetitive consequence necessarily and reasonably results from
engaging in the authorized activity."), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 430 (1991). The "necessary and

reasonable result" test is more restrictive than the Court's "foreseeable result" test.
120. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.

121. See Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1350 n.4. Even the dissent admitted the difficulty of
differentiating between economic regulation and health and safety regulation. See id. at 1361
(Stevens J., dissenting, joined by White & Marshall, JJ.) (" 'Social and safety regulation have
economic impacts, and economic regulation has social and safety effects.' ") (quoting D.
HJELMFELT, ANTITRUST AND REGULATED INDUSTRIES

3 (1985)).
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The Omni dissent, in its argument that federalism does not apply to
municipalities,1 22 failed to recognize the countervailing advantages of
local governments. Concern for the influence of factions is not the
only force behind the division of power between local, state, and federal governments. If such had been the case, local, government would
be given no power whatsoever. The framers recognized that the most
effective democracy occurs at the local level, where the electorate has
personal knowledge of the issues.12 3 Even within The FederalistNo.
10, Madison recognized that interests groups, though potentially dangerous, are an inevitable and vital part of the driving force behind all
levels of government. 124 Although state governments generally use
the bicameral process and diverse representation to combat factions,
local governments have the advantage of decision makers with more
direct knowledge and accountability, and an electorate with greater
voice in the process.12 5 Moreover, the local government is not
bestowed with much independent power, it is merely an arm of the
state, and must answer to it. Under Omni, municipalities must still
adhere to the foreseeable result test when enacting anticompetitive
ordinances. Thus, giving local governments broader power to regulate
matters of local concern presents little real danger.
iii. Mixed Blessings: The Difficulty of Interpreting the Foreseeable
Result Test
Although the foreseeable result test broadens municipal immunity,
the test still requires the municipality to predict the foreseeability of a
given action. Some of the potential benefit will be lost because of
uncertainty. A municipality must determine from the language of a
statute whether the legislature foresaw that the municipality would act
in an anticompetitive way.126 The task of statutory interpretation has
proven difficult for courts,12 7 and municipalities face these same difficulties. In fact, municipalities may have an even more difficult time,
122. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
123. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 107 (Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST
No. 17, at 316 (Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961), cited in Jorde, supra note 3, at 232; see also
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 575 n.18 (1985).
124. Page, supra note 33, at 629-31.
125. See Rose, supra note 50, at 886-87.
126. Justice Stewart anticipated this obstacle when pointing out the problem of finding
legislative intent at the state level where such history is often not recorded and the statutory
language is unclear. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 438
(1978).
127. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 44 (1985) (adopting Justice
Stewart's argument that state legislative history is a poor basis for a clear articulation standard).
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since municipalities may lack the legal expertise to make subtle, quasijudicial, distinctions. Furthermore, a foreseeability test is still not
totally consistent with the Omni Court's concern for federalism.
The foreseeability test will still require courts to make intrusive
inquiries into state administration. The Omni Court's conclusion that
the power to zone foreseeably includes the power to regulate flows
logically from zoning's inherent economic effects, but other types of
legislation will not afford so ready an answer. Federal courts will inevitably find themselves considering legislative history and other sources
in contradiction to the Court's policy of federalism.1 28
The largest problem with the foreseeability test, however, is its equitable application to home rule cities. The Omni decision will affect
delegations of power through specific grants of authority. As pointed
out earlier, the Supreme Court has never required "specific detailed
authorization" 12' 9 from a statute to justify state action immunity.
Before Omni, however, Boulder required that the state legislature had
to make an affirmative statement that it intended to displace competition with regulation. Moreover, a statute of "mere neutrality respecting the municipal actions" was not an adequate manifestation of intent
that would trigger the state action doctrine. 30 Omni has altered the
Court's position with respect to grants of a specific kind of authority
that are neutral as to competition."3 1 The decision did not do so by
overtly changing the test, but by finding that anticompetitive conduct
was a foreseeable result of a zoning statute that many courts have
declared to be neutral.1 2 In fact, the neutrality standard seems to
have been reversed. Now, any neutral grant of a specific power may
be enough to show that the state could have foreseen that the power
would be used in an anticompetitive fashion. Unfortunately, home
rule cities will not benefit from the change.
iv.

Overruling Boulder

The Omni decision results in a substantial benefit for cities that
operate under enabling acts. It is little help, however, for cities that
128. Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 43, at 743.
129. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415.
130. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55 (1982).
131. The dissent argued that South Carolina's Zoning Enabling Act was "simply neutral" as
to its possible anticompetitive consequences. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1344, 1360 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by White & Marshall JJ.).
132. For a more restrictive treatment of municipal immunity under neutral statutes see supra
note 88.
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derive much of their power from home rule provisions. The problem
for home rule cities is that Boulder is distinguishable from OmnL
At first, it is difficult to reconcile the Boulder holding with Omn.
At one point, there was a distinction between statutes like those in
Hallie,which were clearly articulated grants of authority, and in Boulder where there was a neutral grant of authority.1 33 Omni has narrowed that gap. Courts in the past have held that a zoning enabling
act is neutral as to anticompetitive activity." 4 In fact, the home rule
constitutional provision in Boulder is arguably as neutral concerning
economic impact as the zoning enabling act in Orni.
Comparison of the facts in Boulder and Omni reveals, however, that
there is a distinguishing factor. In Boulder, the home rule provision of
the state constitution contained no specific grant of authority. The
constitution granted municipalities the general authority to legislate,
but made no mention of cable television regulation. The Boulder decision refused to accept "that the general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific
anticompetitive ordinances." 13 5 In contrast, the state statute in Omni
granted specific authority to zone in the zoning enabling act.13 6 The
authority to zone is more specific than the bare authority to legislate.
Thus, the Omni Court could more easily determine the legislature's
intent in granting Columbia zoning authority.
The distinction between Omni and Boulder is too narrow a difference on which to base antitrust liability. The authority to legislate
provided by home rule should provide sufficient f1reseeability to satisfy the Omni test. In examining the statute in question in Hallie, the
Court said that "anticompetitive effects logically would result from
this broad authority to regulate." 137 Furthermore, Omni repudiated
the idea that the relevant grant of authority need specify the type of
industry regulated or that the authority granted be labelled economic
regulation at all. 138 Thus, Omni has already moved toward the proposition that anticompetitive effects logically result from the broad
authority to legislate such as those given by a home rule provision.
Overruling Boulder also tends to maximize the general goals of federalism. Although the Colorado home rule provision is not a specific
133.
134.
1979).
135.
136.
137.
138.
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See Hoaglund, supra note 99, at 1049.
See Mason City Ctr. Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp 737, 742-43 (N.D. Iowa
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 (1982).
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1350 (1991).
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985).
Omni, 111 S. Ct. at 1350 n.4.
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grant of authority, it stands to reason that what Colorado envisioned
in granting such authority was a very broad power. 1 39 Almost any
government action involves some amount of interference in the market
that could be labeled a restraint of trade. From paving roads and levying taxes to outright regulation of businesses, government action
inherently interferes with the market place. Thus, some anticompetitive activity is a foreseeable result of granting the authority to govern.
To insist on greater specificity for particular anticompetitive activities
would return to the clear articulation standard from which the Omni
Court departed."4 Further, for the federal courts to insist that the
states be more specific is an unwarranted intrusion on state administrative procedure. It is not logical that states that give their large cities the most autonomy should find those cities more restricted by the
antitrust laws than are the smaller towns. Moreover, larger cities are
less likely to experience the factional problem particular to smaller
cities because the governments of large cities are likely to represent a
wide variety of interests. The federal courts should not interfere with
the basic state policy decision to let home rule cities govern
themselves.
The Boulder rule also produces inconsistent and unjust results in the
lower courts. If the rule is followed, zoning ordinances based on zoning enabling acts will be treated differently than zoning ordinances
based on home rule provisions of state constitutions. Two cities with
the same zoning ordinance should be treated the same way unless the
state legislatures had different motives in allowing their cities to zone.
Under a foreseeability standard, however, any difference between the
intent of the legislature in either case would be but a figment of judicial imagination. There is no real difference in foreseeability of
anticompetitive effects in ordinances based on an enabling act versus
those based on a home rule grant. The Boulder distinction relies only
on a technical basis of authority. The unfairness of this anomaly suggests that Boulder should be overruled.
Treating home rule municipalities equally would not entail a major
change in the state action doctrine as it has been developed in Omni.
A court could simply decide whether the home rule provision gives
authority for the general type of activity in question. Although state
139. See Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 43, at 747-58 (home rule provisions are not
neutral grants of authority and should have passed the clear articulation test).
140. When the Boulder court argued that a grant of legislative power was not an
authorization for a specific anticompetitive ordinance, the authority upon which it relied was the
now outdated "clear articulation and affirmative expression" test. See Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 (1982).
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home rule provisions are usually very general grants of power, most
states have a fairly well-developed common law circumscribing home
rule powers.14 1 After the question of authority is settled, a federal
court can employ the Omni method to determine foreseeability. There
is no need to have specific language in an enabling act to interpret. A
court can make the foreseeability ruling based on the general authority
to act in the area as it did in Omn. Consequently, the Supreme Court
should overrule Boulder and treat non-home rule municipalities and
home rule municipalities equally.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Omni has considerably broadened municipal
antitrust immunity for certain municipalities by expanding the state
action doctrine. First, the authority prong is easily met as Omni precludes substantive inquiry into the municipality's basis of authority.
Second, the Court requires a municipality's action to be a foreseeable
result of regulatory authority and not a result of a clearly articulated
state policy.
Although Omni involved a zoning ordinance, its foreseeability test
will apply to many other kinds of local ordinances. Unfortunately, the
test is bound to produce uncertainty. The test is also inconsistent with
the very principles of federalism that Omni purportedly reaffirmed.
Further, the foreseeability test will not provide greater immunity for
home rule municipalities. Sound policy reasons such as more efficient
state review, local autonomy, and confidence in the local political process all support greater municipal immunity for home rule cities. Consequently, the Court should overrule Boulder so as not to impose the
greatest federal restrictions on the very municipalities the states
entrust with the greatest freedom.
Brent S. Kinkade
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Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 43, at 753-58.

